Gemini CLI’s v0.70.0 release, published on November 19, 2026, adds launch-path security checks for centrally managed local tool integrations. If a system MCP server is skipped for insecure permissions, administrators need to repair its launch files and directories, retain the intended tool restrictions and restart the CLI. The update checks the installation; it does not repair permissions for you.
MCP, short for Model Context Protocol, connects the assistant to external tools and data. This change concerns programs launched from system-wide configuration, not every connection an individual Gemini user creates. The enterprise guidance makes the practical requirement clear: protect the files behind an approved integration, not only its settings.
Why does Gemini CLI skip a system MCP server?
The merged change description explains the problem: an administrator could approve a server name while its launcher remained writable by an ordinary user or shared group. Changing that launcher could substitute an unapproved server that inherited the approved name’s automatic tool permissions. This is a tool-authorization issue, not evidence of operating-system privilege escalation or observed exploitation.
The checks cover local commands in both settings.json and system-defaults.json, including recognized interpreter script arguments and the older mcp.serverCommand setting. A rejected server name is also blocked in the resolved configuration, case-insensitively. Recreating it under the same name in user or workspace settings is not a repair. See the release-pinned settings implementation.
Remote entries containing only url or httpUrl are outside these command-path checks. Ordinary user/workspace definitions are not directly checked as system entries, though a rejected system counterpart can block the same name. These distinctions are covered in the project’s configuration tests.
Check the installed version and managed settings
Use your organization’s normal deployment process for v0.70.0, which contains this change. For npm-managed installations, the following pins the documented installation command to the available numbered package. Confirm the version of the binary employees actually launch; updating another installation will not change their session.
npm install -g @google/gemini-cli@0.70.0Before editing anything, preserve the existing configuration and identify the file named in the warning. The documented default system-settings locations are:
Linux:
/etc/gemini-cli/settings.json.macOS:
/Library/Application Support/GeminiCli/settings.json.Windows:
C:\ProgramData\gemini-cli\settings.json.
system-defaults.json normally shares that directory. Deployment-specific environment overrides can relocate either file, so inspect the effective paths rather than assuming the defaults. Keep unrelated settings intact. The path-resolution code defines both locations.
For teams administering more than one coding assistant, the separate Codex automation project-trust guide is a related configuration review, not a substitute for this repair.
Repair the files behind the launch command
The startup warning identifies the server, settings file, offending command or script path, and reason. Start there, then inspect its directory chain and anything the launcher invokes.
On Linux and macOS, checked files and directories must be owned by
rootand must not have group-write or other-write permission bits. A root-owned file can still fail because a parent directory is writable. These are the POSIX checks in the release.On Windows, inspect ownership and access-control lists. The enterprise guide recommends SYSTEM or Administrators ownership and protection from non-administrator writes. Follow platform-specific policy; a Unix permissions command is not a Windows fix.
Follow symbolic links to their real targets and inspect ancestor directories. The security helper checks more than the visible filename, so changing only the launcher’s mode may leave the rejection unresolved.
Review scripts passed to interpreters and any secondary scripts, binaries or dependencies invoked inside wrappers. The managed-server guidance recommends fixed absolute binary paths inside wrappers. Do not assume startup checks recursively audit a script’s contents.
Repair or redeploy the affected managed package, rather than applying recursive ownership changes across unrelated directories. Keeping launch files administrator-owned does not require running Gemini CLI as root.
The practical implication: for managed local tools, trust depends on administrator-controlled launch files, not just an approved server name.
Keep server approval separate from tool permissions
Retain the centrally managed server definition and intended mcp.allowed list. Removing the list to restore connectivity also removes the intended restriction on which server names users may add. The enterprise configuration examples distinguish these two controls.
Check automatic approval as well as connection access. In the released policy code, mcp.allowed generates allow rules for the named server’s tools outside plan mode, independently of the server’s trust flag. Setting trust: false is therefore not enough to guarantee a confirmation prompt while leaving the name allowlisted. Other higher-priority policy rules can still change the outcome.
Limit the tools available from each approved server to what the workflow needs. The MCP configuration reference says includeTools exposes only the listed tool names; excludeTools wins if a name appears in both lists. Review those filters separately from launch-file ownership and any confirmation policy.
Verify the repair under the ordinary user account
After a controlled repair, restart Gemini CLI as the intended non-administrator user. Use /mcp to inspect connection status and available tools, as described in the MCP status guide. A useful acceptance check has three parts:
The targeted insecure-path warning has disappeared.
The intended server connects and exposes only the expected tools.
An integration already prohibited by the organization’s policy remains unavailable.
The absence of a warning does not establish that every launch dependency is safe or that the server will connect. The configuration tests leave ordinary bare executable names resolved through PATH outside these particular path checks. The security helper also tolerates nonexistent targets because there is nothing to load; the later launch can still fail. Wrapper dependencies need their own review.
These checks protect installation integrity; they do not by themselves establish a file or network sandbox. For a separate example of process restrictions, see file and network limits for Codex MCP servers. Do not assume those settings apply to Gemini CLI. The Gemini enterprise guide also warns that managed settings are not a foolproof boundary against someone with local administrative rights.
